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cross decades, disagreements about how to teach students to
read have been framed as the reading wars (Castles, Rastle, &
Nation, 2018; Goldenberg, 2020; Nicholson, 1992; Pearson,
2004). The plurality of the phrase indicates its longevity, and the war
metaphor alludes to binaries that define the oppositional perspectives.
What is referred to as the science of reading (SOR) has often been positioned among its adherents on one end of the binary as the final arbiter
of who can claim victory (see Seidenberg, Cooper Borkenhagen, &
Kearns, 2020). This perspective often views reading specialists in either
schools or on teacher education faculties as largely, perhaps deliberately,
uninformed about scientific research in reading (Seidenberg, 2017).
Some have even argued that the SOR has already settled much of the
debate (Castles et al., 2018; Petscher et al., 2020) or made it moot.
However, as we argue in this article, what is considered to be the SOR—
its essential character, its scope, and its applicability in matters of teaching reading—also stands on much contested ground.
To open a window for discussion, we focus on a long-standing
binary, nature versus nurture, which for our purposes historicizes a fundamentally contested dualism whenever the term science is applied to
any human behavior, such as reading and teaching reading (cf. Ellis &
Bloch, 2021; Ellis & Solms, 2018). It is entwined with and sustained by
other binaries, one being the qualitative/quantitative paradigms that
guide research methods. On the one hand, the nature side of the binary
attends to the biological and neurological processes that produce cognition, with the understanding that “reading is mainly an internal event”
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(Seidenberg et al., 2020, p. S124). On the other hand, the
nurture side emphasizes the environmental influences of
social, situational, and cultural factors and how thinking
processes develop locally (Cole, 1996; Tulviste, 1991). The
debate over nature versus nurture has troubled psychologists since Francis Galton coined the phrase in 1869
(1875/2012), and therefore, it is not surprising that its
applicability to reading research is only one of countless
instantiations in the social sciences.
Our focus, in keeping with the intent of this special
issue, is to raise some questions related to the science
behind the SOR movement and to the reliability of claims
made by those aligned with the nature side of the binary.
In this article, we specifically address four limitations that
we believe raise questions about the assumptions underlying, and thus conclusions reached, when the SOR is
limited to the nature side of the binary and the experimental methods that typically accompany that view:
(1) too heavy a reliance on a narrow conception of science
claimed to be authoritative and monolithic, (2) too little
accounting for environmental factors that complicate the
idea that the brain functions identically across the whole
of the human population, (3) an exclusive view that
experimental designs and replicability are the gold standard of scientific research when other approaches have
generated many useful insights, and (4) dismissal of all
other conceptions of reading as unscientific and, therefore, of marginal value in generating knowledge about
reading and how to teach it.
We discuss these limitations not to dismiss out of
hand or to denigrate the findings often put forth from the
nature side of the binary. Rather, our inquiry is concerned
with the ways in which, within the reading wars, conceptions of the SOR have most frequently been grounded in,
and often limited to, individualistic, biological, cognitive,
or neurological orientations to understanding mental
functions in reading isolated from environmental influences. This focus has persisted despite recent work in the
neurosciences (e.g., Dehaene-
Lambertz, Monzalvo, &
Dehaene, 2018; Ellis & Bloch, 2021; Lee, Meltzoff, & Kuhl,
2020; Noble & Simon, 2020) using brain-imaging methods that has shown the effects of learning to read and
other cultural and social acts on certain brain structures.
Additionally, it is not our intent to unequivocally
endorse an equally narrow and exclusive focus on the
nurture side of the binary, nor to suggest that it cannot be
critically examined. However, in contemporary considerations of the SOR movement, the nurture side of the
binary has rarely been acknowledged, cited, or promoted
as a legitimate source of findings for understanding and
for teaching reading (e.g., Hanford, 2018). It is more commonly the case that findings considered to reflect the
SOR, primarily conceived on the nature side of the binary,
are promoted as the sine qua non of all considerations
of how reading is understood or taught, and are often
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couched in a rhetoric that gives them unsurpassed prestige and credibility (e.g., Hanford, 2018; Petscher et al.,
2020; Seidenberg, 2017).
Thus, our focus on critiquing the nature side of the
binary was prompted by its dominance in contemporary
considerations of the SOR. However, to restore balance to
our critique and to take a more constructive relational,
metatheoretical stance, in subsequent sections, we provide
an alternative frame for arguing that the two orientations
are necessarily related and mutually informative. To illustrate this possibility, we identify some collaborations that
deliberately put nature and nurture—neurobiology and
social context—in fundamental relation to each other (for
further examples, see Nasir, Lee, Pea, & McKinney de
Royston, 2020; Noble & Simon, 2020). We also acknowledge that many authors writing in the two Reading Research
Quarterly special issues on the SOR have recently advocated
expanding the SOR terminology to include issues of race
and ethnicity (Milner, 2020), second-
language learning
(Goldenberg, 2020), content knowledge (Cabell & Hwang,
2020), comprehension (Cervetti et al., 2020), culturally sustaining pedagogy (Vaughn, Parsons, & Massey, 2020), and
research in teacher education (Hoffman, Hikida, & Sailors,
2020), perspectives with which we are fully aligned.
The organization of our argument begins with a discussion of three primary concepts or premises on which
our critique is based: metatheory that provides the general
framework for understanding how individual theories in
the reading wars can be positioned conceptually, the concept of abstracted empiricism or an uncritical and overreliance on quantitative data, and a distinction between
empirical findings taken at face value versus those which
have true scientific worth. After this discussion, we pre
sent several issues and concerns with findings in the SOR
movement that are characterized by its narrow view of science, several inappropriate generalizations from questionable inductions, distorted theorizing from imprecise data
gathering and interpretation, and the inconsistency of
reliable experimental replication. We conclude our discussion with some promising examples of rapprochement
between the neurobiological and social sides, a synthesis
of research approaches that appears to be the trend of
future literacy research (Lee et al., 2020).

Foundational Concepts
and Premises
Split Versus Relational Metatheory
The first foundational concept underpinning our critique
involves what is known as metatheory. Metatheories are
theories about theories. Overton (2015) argued that
metatheories represent “background concepts, which are
so termed because, although they establish the framing

context for the whole paradigm, they seldom explicitly
enter into the discourse of any specific set of investigations” (p. 13). These metatheoretical concepts constitute
worldviews “that describe and prescribe what is acceptable and unacceptable, meaningful and meaningless as
theory—the means of conceptual exploration of any scientific domain—and these rules place constraints on theoretical and observational discourse” (p. 15). In other
words, metatheories provide the set of typically unspecified assumptions on which sets of related theories and
their own foundational tenets are built (for similar views,
see Bateson, 1979; Gould, 2003; Hruby, 2017; Vygotsky,
1987). Thus, metatheories exert great influence over
research in guiding what assumptions are made, what
questions are asked, what and how studies are conducted,
what theories are used and considered relevant, what
interpretations and conclusions are offered, and with
what sides of various binaries an individual researcher or
disciplinary community is aligned.
Overton (2015) distinguished between two broad
epistemological worldviews that he called split metatheory and relational metatheory. Split metatheories adhere
to a Cartesian mind/body dualism. In terms of the nature/
nurture binary, one pole of the binary privileges internal
dimensions such as genetic inheritances, neurological
structures, or cognitive processes. The other pole emphasizes contextual factors such as the social environment,
family histories, and cultural features.
In contrast, Overton (2015) described relational
metatheories as bridging the Cartesian gap. Relational
theories avoid the dualistic positioning that underlie the
reading wars. Instead, these theories seek to investigate
the processes involved in the integration, coordination,
and interweaving of internal, biological factors and environmental and social influences in human development.
Dick (2017) situated Overton’s (2015) analysis within
a developmental framework available in the relational
turn underway in various disciplines. Developmental
processes involve probabilistic epigenesis that
emphasizes the reciprocity of influences within and between
levels of an organism’s developmental manifold (genetic activity, neural activity, behavior, and the physical, social, and cultural influences of the external environment) and the ubiquity
of gene–environment interaction in the realization of all phenotypes. (Gottlieb, 2007, p. 1)

According to this perspective, human thinking develops
in ways shaped by the biological possibilities provided by
nature in relation to the factors available through the
environment (Ellis & Solms, 2018). Neither influence follows a fateful destiny; biology may be affected by interventions (e.g., drugs, surgery, trauma), and environments’
shifting forms mediate cognition idiosyncratically.
However, SOR research, for the most part, as it has
been employed in the reading wars, has focused almost

exclusively on nature and is characteristically a split
metatheory. The focus has been on biology, neurological
structures, eye movements, and primarily what goes on
inside the head and how the typical brain works to decipher written language (cf. Adams, 1990, 2001; Coltheart,
2007; Dehaene, 2009; Kintsch, 2019; Seidenberg, 2017;
Shaywitz, 2020; Snowling & Hulme, 2005; Stanovich,
1986). We address the difficulties of this narrow view in
upcoming sections.

The Limits of Abstracted Empiricism
Another premise of our argument is centered around the
exclusion of the environmental, social, and cultural dimensions of literacy from instructional interventions in nature-
focused approaches that invites adherence to what the
sociologist C. Wright Mills (1959/2000) called abstracted
empiricism. Abstracted empiricism refers to exclusive, or
disproportionate, emphasis on collecting and analyzing
quantifiable data with relatively little emphasis on what the
data mean and why they are important, at least beyond an
immediate question or issue (see also Kerdeman & Phillips,
1993). Abstracted empiricism can lead to impoverished
theorizing; unfounded, atheoretical extrapolation beyond
data; and failure to explicitly acknowledge the assumptions
that guide research.
We are concerned that many SOR studies often have
remained at the level of abstracted empiricism in interpreting biological findings or testing reading methods
experimentally. For example, such work has yet to establish a viable translational theory (for arguments, see
Kearns, 2020; Seidenberg et al., 2020; Shanahan, 2020)
that connects empirical data from basic brain research
with instructional interventions that specify how to
teach phonics to first-grade students in different instructional contexts. Indeed, it is debatable whether any such
link is actually warranted (cf. Ansari, Coch, & De Smedt,
2011; Bowers, 2020; Bruer, 1997; Hruby & Goswami,
2011; Mayer, 2017).

Empiricist Versus Scientific Research
The final core concept of our argument against narrow
interpretations of the SOR derives from Chambers’s (1992)
distinction between empiricist and scientific research and
theory. We argue that the former limits attention only to
what can be observed and measured. The demarcation by
Chambers of scientific versus empiricist studies directly
bears on, we believe, the viability of the SOR in generating
useful knowledge. He cited classic examples of how truly
revolutionary science entails moving beyond empirical
data to infer more overarching understandings, such as the
heliocentric view of the universe, the discovery of the
structure of the DNA molecule, and the formulation of
plate tectonic theory to demonstrate how scientists such as

The Trouble With Binaries: A Perspective on the Science of Reading | S121

Copernicus, Kepler, Wegener, Watson and Crick (and
likely Franklin; see Lloyd, 2010), and others were not constrained by what they saw through measuring instruments
and the raw data generated. As Chambers observed, it was
“not because such savants observed more precisely, but
because they penetrated behind the superficial regularity
disclosed by the senses” (p. 75).
Further, those investigators’ conceptual abstractions
were subject to a critique of their assumptions and an
expected acknowledgment that they were typically no
more than temporary working hypotheses that may generate new insights, further research, and debate about
what data to gather and how to interpret those data. The
conceptual frames were always expected to be refined and
shifted, if not be replaced entirely, by new theoretical
frameworks or paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). These are examples of how, historically, science is never settled but,
rather, is constantly evolving in relation to new findings
that refine or even shift knowledge about phenomena.
This evolutionary process is true in both the hard and
social sciences, contrary to how science often has been
claimed in the SOR movement as having the ability to
produce absolute knowledge (Gentry & Ouellette, 2019;
Hanford, 2018; Petscher et al., 2020).

functions as the primary basis for understanding what
much evidence, to the contrary, indicates is instead a
complex socioneurobiological-cognitive process (Edelman,
1992; Ellis & Solms, 2018), with the split coming in its
focus on the neurobiological and cognitive at the expense
of the social (for a compatible view, see Shaywitz, 2020; for
critiques of this approach, see Hruby, 2012, 2017).
We lack the space here to enumerate the profound
philosophical conundrums associated with determining
how three pounds of white, gray, squishy gook the texture
of English oatmeal (Searle, as cited in Kreisler, 1999;
Searle, 1997) produces consciousness or thinking. Within
the neurosciences, however, serious critiques of brain-
imaging methods have emerged. Many researchers in
neurobiology (e.g., Elliott et al., 2020; Hickok, 2014; Lyon,
2017) have voiced alarming concerns about the validity
and preciseness of brain imaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to detect reliable biomarkers in processes such as reading and in the
diagnosis of other mental activity. For example, in a recent
meta-analysis of 90 experiments designed to detect various biomarkers in neural activity, Elliott et al. (2020) concluded that “collectively, these findings demonstrate that
common task-fMRI measures are not currently suitable
for brain biomarker discovery or for individual-differences
research” (p. 792). Further, Duke researcher Ahmad
Hariri, a member of the Elliott research team, has quesAssessing Selected Claims of
tioned 15 years’ worth of his own publications on MRI,
the SOR Movement: Some Caveats basically revealing that replication studies, even with the
In this section, we introduce several concerns with some same participants, generate different results with not only
common interpretations found in the SOR movement weak correlations but also poor ones. Hariri went so far as
related to brain-
imaging and eye movement studies, to say, “The bottom line is that task-based fMRI in its curwhich then have been uncritically generalized to system- rent form can’t tell you what an individual’s brain activaatic phonics instruction and other explicit teaching tech- tion will look like from one test to the next” (as cited in
niques. Woven into our discussion of these concerns are Bates, 2020, para. 10).
In addition, the distinction between empiricist re
the concepts described earlier—metatheory, abstracted
empiricism, and the empiricist/scientific distinction— search and extrapolatory scientific research is relevant in
with particular emphasis on how they are embedded considering examples from brain-imaging investigations.
These studies use calculated (not raw) data (Hickok, 2014;
within results and on how they shape interpretations.
Roskies, 2007), needing sophisticated, statistical algorithms to generate constructed, composite pictures from
The Tenuous Foundation of
multiple, selected fMRI slices, which actually measure
Split-Metatheoretical Thinking
subtle changes in the magnetic polarity of water moleCitations frequently have been made in SOR-oriented pub- cules in the brain; in essence, the slices are not equivalent
lications (e.g., Petscher et al., 2020; Seidenberg, 2017) to the to photographs (Roskies, 2007). Inferences are then
research of cognitive neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene and uncritically derived from these constructed, multicolored
colleagues (Dehaene, 2009; Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2018; pictures and extrapolated to classroom practices that fit
Monzalvo & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2013), who claimed that with theories about the relation between neurobiology
all brains have a visual word form area or letterbox located and action in the world or, in our case, processes of and
in the lower occipital visual cortex that processes letter subsequent instruction in reading. However, Elliott et al.’s
strings. This brain mechanism “distributes this invariant (2020) statement “that commonly used task-fMRI meavisual information to numerous regions, spread over the sures lack the minimal reliability standards” (p. 801) for
left hemisphere, that encode word meaning, sound pattern, identifying abnormal brain activity should raise serious
and articulation” (Dehaene, 2009, p. 63). Dehaene’s work caveats in interpreting any imaging study as applicable to
fits comfortably within split metatheories that posit brain classroom applications.
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Other troublesome issues with generalizing from
fMRI studies include research on individuals with brain
damage showing that neural functions often migrate to
other areas (Doidge, 2015) and that, in fact, there is little
consensus about how to analyze fMRI data, as different
techniques produce different outcomes (Roskies, 2007).
Thus, cognitive neuroscientist Gregory Hickok (2014)
stated that “despite the clean, pretty pictures we see in
journal articles or in the press, it is important to recognize
that the data behind those pictures are rather noisy and
can be imprecise” (p. 251).
We realize, however, that studying the brain does not
preclude attention to factors outside of it. For example,
Nobel laureates Edelman (1992) and Kandel (2007) identified relations across a much broader and more complex
array of neurological patterning that includes both neural
functioning and social and environmental influences that
contribute to cognitive processing, including reading (see
also Goodman, Fries, & Strauss, 2016; Noble & Simon,
2020). These studies have tended to view the brain as one
component of the more distributed human mind, which
extends beyond the skin (Wertsch & Tulviste, 1992) and
includes tools, sociocultural mediation, and many historical ways of being that shape present cognition, and other
external factors from outside the body, particularly from
outside the head.
Unfortunately, bodily factors such as illness, neurology, trauma, hunger, and other influences do not figure
into the SOR locus for cognition. The brain itself is where
the action is, with measures in neuroscience uncritically
perceived by the public, legislators, and some researchers
to be more precise and informative than behavioral indices (Noble & Simon, 2020). This perception has spawned
the increasing privatization and frequency of dubious
educational solutions by for-profit companies (Gabriel,
2020). This narrow, split-metatheoretical attention on the
brain elides attention to the sorts of environmental factors
that would question so-called best (Reinking, 2007) and
high-leverage practices and that would argue instead that
what works in classrooms also requires an accounting for
the contexts that have shaped students’ learning outside
school and the factors that shape activity within schools
(Smagorinsky, 2009, 2018).

The Limits of Inductive Generalization
It is important to acknowledge that some form of inductive
generalization is essential to everyday living. Life would be
unbearably complicated if people could not draw generalized assumptions and predictions from an accumulation of
past experience. For instance, people who toss a ball into
the air are confident that it will come down. However, as
Scottish philosopher David Hume (1739/1985) pointed
out nearly three centuries ago, such everyday thinking and
the experience of constant conjunction foster a habit of the

mind that leads us to, in many cases, uncritically anticipate
the conclusion on the occasion of a new instance of the second premise (as cited in Henderson, 2020). Although these
habits of mind become engrained through socialization
and are foundational to the development and perpetuation
of cultures (Shweder, 1991), for good or ill, when they are
based on dubious premises, incomplete facts, and biased
interpretations, they can produce grave problems in society and in science.
The extent to which abstracted empiricism is operating within the SOR trope employed in the reading wars
may also be exacerbated by the ways in which induction
works in generalizing from findings that claim a scientific
basis. In our view, those who assert that scientific experiments can settle the reading wars might benefit from reconciling that belief with long-standing views about the
role of inductive generalization within the domain of science and among those who work in that domain. Even in
the hard sciences, several notable philosophers of science
have concluded that inductive generalization, even in
physics, introduces many dangers for interpretation (e.g.,
Lakatos, 1968). Further, whereas extensive replication is
assumed to sustain inductive generalizations and to
explore possible anomalies in experimental investigations,
there is a growing body of research demonstrating the
relative infrequency of reliable replication in psychology,
educational research, and many other fields (see, e.g.,
Bohannon, 2015; Lemoine et al., 2016; Schmidt & Oh,
2016; Yong, 2012).
Taleb (2007) described such faulty reasoning as a
black swan event, deriving from the belief among Euro
peans that all swans were white, until they found disconfirming data in Australia in the form of black swans.
Vygotsky (1987) called such examples a pseudoconcept,
one that generalizes improperly from insufficient information. Developmentally, such misconceptions are inevitable in the growth of children and adolescents but should
not, however, form the basis of what is presented as
mature scientific thinking that can have high-stakes consequences for students in school.
Ignoring the limitations of abstracted empiricism and
inductive generalization can be mutually reinforcing in
creating a patina of scientific certainty. Together, they
become even more potent, but also more misleading
when they are used to suggest causality, at least without
some sophisticated statistical manipulations (Pearl, 2014).
This problem is illustrated not only with brain-imaging
approaches discussed previously but also in research on
eye movements. Based on extensive observations, Miles
Tinker (1964) convincingly documented differences in
the eye movements of good and poor readers as they read
texts. However, excluding situational, background, or
motivation issues, he then atheoretically generalized his
findings of eye movement patterns as representing a
causal factor essential to good reading by proposing that
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reading ability could be improved by teaching poor readers to make more efficient eye movements.
Notwithstanding several decades of improvements in
eye-
tracking measurement and analysis since Tinker’s
(1964) research, similar noise and imprecision are still
characteristic of that body of empirical work. Although
frequently cited in the SOR literature (e.g., Adams, 1990,
2001) as demonstrating sequential, letter-by-letter scanning of letters in text, eye movement scan paths are notoriously nonlinear (Holmqvist et al., 2011; Rayner, 1998,
2009), exhibiting frequent regressions, fixations beginning at the middle or ends of words, and multiple, nonsequential fixations on the same words or phrases (Rayner,
2009). Researchers (e.g., Goodman et al., 2016; Rayner,
1998) have consistently found that a substantial number
of words are skipped, with a range of 60–85% of content
words being fixated on and only 35% of function words.
There is even a debate as to whether eye movement location is a good index of what a person is actually thinking
at a particular time (Holmqvist et al., 2011). These findings ought to raise concern about the sorts of generalizations made from both brain-based reading research or eye
tracking and their extrapolations to reading instruction.

The Infrequency and Inconsistency
of Replicable Educational Research
Both confounding and lurking variables pose challenges
for every inductive generalization and attempt at replication. This issue has been long recognized in the literature
of education research, often under the rubric of attribute/
trait–
treatment interactions (Berliner, 2014; Cronbach,
1975) and intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991). Further, there
is evidence that even in the hard sciences, the statistical
effects found in often groundbreaking initial findings
consistently, yet mysteriously, become more moderate, and
sometimes even disappear, over time (for an overview, see
Lehrer, 2010).
In a recent analysis of 100 top-tier, peer-reviewed
research journals in education, including journals reporting reading research, Makel and Plucker (2014) found
that only 13 published studies in 10,000 were replications
and that only six journals had published between one and
five in 100. The low rate of publishing replications, the
authors argued, may be due to editors’ and reviewers’
reluctance to publish studies that only confirm findings
rather than generate new knowledge. Further, Hattie
(2009) analyzed over 800 meta-analyses that included
more than 50,000 experimental studies of interventions
in education across 2 million students. The average effect
size was an unimpressive 0.4, especially given that a bias
exists toward publishing statistically significant findings
at the level of 0.05 or less and that the set of studies investigated included obviously useful pedagogical practices,
such as providing feedback and increasing time on task,
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which allows much space for considering environmental
factors that may be operating.
Further, generalizations about practices based on statistical analyses can be misleading, sometimes due to what is
called Simpson’s paradox (Pearl, 2014), which characterizes
how a generalized finding can be reversed entirely when
data are disaggregated into subgroups. For example, a statistical analysis of two treatments for kidney stones favored
treatment A over treatment B (Julious & Mullee, 1994).
However, paradoxically, when the data for treatments were
separated for large and small kidney stones, treatment B
was statistically superior in both cases. In short, disaggregated data can not only muddy the waters but also, in some
cases, reverse a generalization (Smyth & Schorr, 2009).
As Cronbach (1975) stated in what might be called
relational metatheoretical language, “when we give proper
weight to local conditions, any generalization is a working
hypothesis, not a conclusion” (p. 125). Thus, unless new
analyses can show that reading research is a notable
exception, it is difficult to reconcile these findings with
any claim of definitive generalizations from experimental
research that settle the reading wars, despite the National
Reading Panel’s (National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development, 2000) belief that only experimental studies have validity in determining best practices in
reading instruction.
In this section, we maintained that in the realm of science, the relation between induction and generalization is
not a simple, straightforward one, as is often stated or presumed in the SOR, at least as it is conceptualized in the
reading wars. Specifically, those who assume, or even claim,
that there is a settled SOR, especially one that dictates
unequivocally how reading should be taught for all students, are not operating in the spirit, or within the accepted
interpretive tradition and practice, of science. Therefore, in
the next section, we revisit the concept of metatheory and
propose a relational metatheoretical approach to literacy
research around which, hopefully, former adversaries in the
reading wars can find acceptable compromises.

A Relational Metatheoretical
Approach to a SOR
What might a more inclusive, valid, generative, and educationally productive SOR look like? We believe that at
least part of the answer lies in moving away from the binaries that comprise Overton’s (2015) split metatheories and
moving toward a more integrative stance within relational
metatheories. That synthesis requires seeking a collaborative common ground between binaries, including between
nature (views of research inspired by the natural and biological sciences) and nurture (conceptions of reading and
literacy solely attentive to the environmental, the social,
and influences; Ellis & Solms, 2018). As mentioned earlier,

such inclusivity for broadening the definition and research
base of the SOR has already been advocated by other
authors in these two special issues (e.g., Cabell & Hwang,
2020; Cervetti et al., 2020; Goldenberg, 2020; Hoffman et
al., 2020; Milner, 2020; Vaughn et al., 2020).
We believe that there have been relatively few current
or past models of what such a rapprochement might look
like, but there are some that might be emulated. Vygotsky
is a common reference for those on the nurture side of the
binary, because his work is typically associated with social
factors (Wertsch, 1985). Yet, his focus was not solely on the
environment. Indeed, his collaborator Alexander Luria
became known for his foundational work in neuropsychology, and even Vygotsky enrolled in medical school late
in his illness-shortened career to increase his knowledge of
the biological and neurological aspects of development
(Levitin, 1982; Luria, 1973). As described by Toulmin,
Vygotsky’s research team eschewed a Cartesian duality by
viewing nature and nurture as inextricably intertwined:
Vygotsky’s goal was to discover how enculturation, socialisation, and the development of thought processes are shaped by
the child’s inner life.... In neurological terms, similarly, he
wanted to find out how the social, cultural, linguistic, and
intellectual skills [the child] acquires during the formative
years are supported by, and “represented in,” the cortical mechanisms of the maturing nervous system. (as cited in Levitin,
1982, p. 77)

Vygotsky (1987, 1997) argued that human development is a function of the intersection of nature and nurture. He continually stressed that although germane to
the developing personality, materialist explanations alone
(i.e., biological, neurological, physiological, stimulus–
response mechanisms) of human behavior were never
sufficient to explain the higher, culturally mediated psychological functions, such as attitudes, ideologies, methods of abstract reasoning, memory, emotions, voluntary
attention, or will. To Vygotsky and the cultural-historical
approach that he and his colleagues founded (Cole, 1996),
the nature/nurture debate was not an either/or question
but a both/and proposition (for a recent statement of this
perspective, see Ellis & Bloch, 2021).
Another good model is Ann Brown, whose foundational work derived from carefully controlled experiments
under laboratory-like conditions (e.g., Brown, 1985; Brown
& Smiley, 1977). Yet, equipped with her laboratory data
and the theoretical understandings they generated, she
spent many years subsequently trying to translate that theory into viable instructional practice, working in classrooms. She meshed her laboratory work with pedagogical
perspectives that she found consistent with them, leading
to the development of reciprocal teaching and laying a
foundation for strategy instruction as an important component of developing reading comprehension ability (e.g.,
Palincsar & Brown, 1984). However, Brown wrote about

the inadequacies of her laboratory methods in her classroom work where a myriad of factors and potential obstacles figured into theoretically sound and pedagogically
viable instruction. Her personal insights led her to describe
her work as design experiments. That work became foundational to current design-based research (Reinking, in
press), an approach well suited to solving practical problems through rigorous methods for data collection and
analysis. It also generates theories directly applicable to
pedagogy, much as engineers must be familiar with fundamental theories and research in the physical science but
also knowledgeable about how to apply them practically
(Brown, 1992).
Two other examples, reminiscent of the fruitful Vy
gotsky and Luria collaboration in blending nature and nurture, come to mind. First, Margaret Eisenhart, a cultural
anthropologist interested in education, and Hilda Borko, an
educational psychologist, had a career-long collaboration
leading to a book that highlights principles for conducting
classroom research that melds their differing perspectives
(Eisenhart & Borko, 1993). Their stated aim was not simply
to bring together those perspectives additively but to fully
integrate them synergistically. Second, Lee (with a cultural
practices orientation), Meltzoff, and Kuhl (with a neurophysiological orientation; 2020) collaborated
to see what we can learn from emerging findings in the neurosciences and the convergence of these ideas in other areas of
study, including human development, studies of cognition-in-
context, and studies of the socio-emotional consequences of
participation in cultural practices. (p. 25)

We believe that it is not coincidental that in several of
these examples, the nature/nurture binary was often integrated by working directly in the practical setting of classrooms, rather than in controlled laboratories or in the
armchair. If détente is necessary and achievable in the
reading wars, it is more likely to be achieved through collaborative work that occurs in classrooms. This integration of the theoretical and practical is concerned with
working toward valued pedagogical goals, including the
one of interest here: how to help children and youth
become more skillful, insightful readers of texts. That
view aligns with Dewey’s (1929) belief that research and
practice are inseparable (see Biesta & Burbules, 2003;
Smagorinsky, 1995). He argued that the quest for certainty is often fruitless in an ambiguous world but that
useful knowledge in achieving valued democratic goals
can be achieved when knowledge generation is inextricably linked to practice (Reinking & Yaden, 2020).

Final Comments
We believe that considering split and relational metatheories reveals the limitations of the SOR movement’s narrow
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consideration of what factors and influences explain reading and learning to read. It also underscores the manner in
which the SOR movement’s view of science and its valorization of quantitative, experimental methods not only are
dismissive of critical contextual variables but also generalize from their own data in questionable ways. Specifically,
we conclude that viewing science as an accumulation of
quantifiable empirical data and unqualified inductive generalizations embeds a number of problems that undermine any claims from that perspective to having exclusive
authority in understanding reading and guiding reading
instruction. These include the issues that the SOR, as we
suggested in the introduction, relies on a limited conception of science, ignores relevant environmental factors,
and uncritically accepts experimentation as the only valid
approach to social science inquiry in literacy.
We find these issues to be present in the SOR movement, leading to the oversimplification of understanding
the nature of the reading process, of teaching reading, and
of conducting research into effective reading pedagogies.
The conception of science embedded in SOR research
reduces reading to a technical exercise that eliminates
critical variables that follow from how the vicissitudes of
living in a complex physical and social world contribute
to how people read, why they read, and how they experience reading instruction. Seidenberg (2017), for example,
explicitly dismissed these factors as distractions manufactured by reading teachers and teacher educators that lead
away from, rather than inform, an understanding of brain
functions as they produce acts of reading. As Smagorinsky
(in press) noted, reducing inordinate class sizes, making
buildings safe and sanitary, using resources that are current and accessible, and providing learning environments
that enable teachers to work securely and effectively
would greatly enhance their ability to care for the whole
student and the experiences those students bring individually, culturally, and collectively to schools.
Adopting this broader disposition would involve an
acknowledgment of the tension between global generalizations and local decision making inherent in statistical
analyses (Joyce & Cartwright, 2020) and the ever-expanding
boundary of what constitutes existing knowledge. In de
signing, analyzing, and interpreting their data, SOR re
searchers could expand their focus by considering processes
as much as outcomes, including those processes involved
in the act of reading in relation to the classroom environment and its surroundings, and the many acts involved in
learning to teach and, in turn, teaching students how to
engage with texts and their various sign systems. Such
attention might help move the researchers’ work beyond
only measurable variables and toward attention to reading contexts. The importance of these local classroom
conditions was underscored by Berliner (2014), who
reported that highly rated teachers become evaluated as
incompetent simply by changes in their student populations.
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Because many test measures are insensitive to situational
contexts, conclusions derived solely from measurable outcomes as applied to general populations should be viewed
with extreme skepticism.
Unfortunately, we believe that in many cases, the
cloak of science has been employed to elevate the stature
of SOR work and to promote the certainty and force of its
advocates’ preferred explanations for what reading is and
how it should be taught (e.g., Gentry & Ouellette, 2019;
Schwartz & Sparks, 2019). What we suggested in this article is that the SOR, when so used in the reading wars, is
not science at all in its fullest sense. It neglects an entire
domain that influences and shapes human experience. It
does so with an unmitigated confidence that evidence
from one side of a binary can establish a final truth and
that such a truth creates a single prescription for all
instruction. Taking that stance, however, is outside the
pale of science and dismisses work that has both merit on
its own terms and a critical role in advancing the aims
motivating reading research and instruction.
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